The Art of Freedom by Juliane Rebentisch

Author:Juliane Rebentisch [Rebentisch, Juliane]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Published: 2016-05-14T00:00:00+00:00

11. Repetitions

When it comes to sketching the outlines of an ethics of aesthetic existence, it is crucial that we defend aesthetic existence – i.e. the consciousness that we have termed “irony” – against the suspicion of subjectivism that has afflicted it ever since Hegel. But then, as we have already seen in our discussion of Hegel, this consciousness is no longer merely an indicator of alienation from social practices in general. Instead, the sensibility hastily rejected by its critics as being a case of irony points to local experiences of alienation from concrete determinations that do not lead into endless circles of groundless reflection, but rather give us occasion to re-determine ourselves. In this sense, ironic consciousness can be defended as a necessary accompaniment to a historically dynamic concept of freedom; this concept picks up on the fundamental instability of our practical orientations as well as the resulting necessity of deciding on these orientations ever anew. It neither subsumes individuals under the social (which would cause the latter to lose its liveliness) nor does it isolate them from the social in a state of sublime inwardness, a kind of asocial hereafter.

In this context, we should mention that at the end of his dissertation, Kierkegaard himself attempts an ethical rescue of irony, employing the term “controlled irony” (cf. CI 324–9) in order to re-define it as a crucial element of a proper kind of freedom. Ironic detachment from practices is no longer understood as a model for an entire life, rather it is “reduced to an element” (CI 325). As a controlled element, Kierkegaard praises irony. Inasmuch as it “rescues the soul from having its life in finitude,” it is not only “the absolute beginning of personal life” (CI 326) but also a “guide” throughout that life (CI 327). The role that irony plays in “personal life” (CI 326) is analogous to the role that doubt plays in science; it has the function of demanding that individuals “balance the accounts” (CI 327). In this sense, irony is even defined as the path to “truth, actuality, content” (CI 326). By casting doubt on beliefs adopted from science or elsewhere, irony moves individuals to take up a position on these beliefs, either rejecting or adopting them. In this function, Kierkegaard writes that irony is “extremely important in enabling personal life to gain health and truth” (CI 328). Irony “manifests itself in its truth precisely by teaching how to actualize actuality” (ibid.).

As convincing as it might seem to define ironic detachment not as a model for the subject but as a productive aspect in its practical life, we must recognize that Kierkegaard reconciles irony and ethics by referring to “controlled” irony. In order for irony to fulfill such a crucial function, it requires the control exercised by a life that is “rounded off” (cf. CI 325), one that is “positively free in the actuality to which he belongs” (CI 326). It is only to this kind of “master” (CI 325) that irony can be a “serving spirit” (CI 325).

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